We exploit unexpected corporate data breaches to study how firms respond to negative reputation events. Data breaches negatively affect firm value by 10-20% following the event, and this effect lasts for years. However, consistent with a decline in corporate reputation reducing the value of a firm's pre-existing corporate social responsibility (CSR) investments, we find that firms significantly increase their investment in CSR by an average of 0.4-0.5 standard deviations in the years following an unexpected breach. Our paper represents the first empirical study to directly link CSR to corporate reputations and presents the first evidence in the literature that firms actively invest in CSR as the result of a negative reputation shock.
Introduction
Corporations have reputations to protect, just like individuals. However, the costs of protecting a corporate reputation, or the costs of losing one, are not well understood.
In this paper, we exploit unexpected corporate data breaches as a negative shock to the reputation of publicly-traded U.S. firms. Theoretical arguments (Kreps, 1990; Tadelis, 1999) and empirical evidence (Armour, Mayer, and Polo, 2017; Karpoff, Lee, and Martin, 2008; Murphy and Shrieves, 2009 ) suggest that negative reputation shocks can be costly, and recent scandals at well-known firms such as News Corp. and Volkswagen have reaffirmed the fragility of corporate reputations.
1 However, corporations can also invest in technologies such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) to build their reputations or to provide insurance against a future reputation shock. To date, however, there is no causal evidence that firms actively invest in costly activities such as CSR in order to protect or improve their reputations following a negative shock.
The idea that CSR can provide insurance against negative shocks has been examined in prior studies. However, existing studies have focused on whether firms' pre-existing stocks of CSR can help to mitigate the effects of negative corporate events such as product recalls, oil spills, or financial crises. In contrast, we focus on identifying a setting in which firms experience a negative reputation shock that is arguably unrelated to their business prospects, their product quality, or the state of the economy. We then examine whether firms invest in replenishing their stock of CSR following a negative reputation shock. In particular, we argue that a negative reputation shock that is unrelated to firms' existing CSR investments might effectively reduce the value of the firm's existing stock of CSR, causing the firm to consider investing even more in reputation-building activities such as CSR following the shock. To 1 In particular, the Volkswagen emission test manipulation scandal and the many recent scandals at News Corp. The idea that reputation is fragile date back to the ancient Roman writer Publilius Syrus ("a good reputation is more valuable than money") and Benjamin Franklin ("it takes many good deeds to build a good reputation, and only one bad [deed] to lose it"). our knowledge, this argument is new to the literature.
Our results suggest that negative reputation shocks are at least partially insurable through mechanisms such as CSR. We find that firms affected by a material data breach experience cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of -1.9% to -2.6% in the 30 days following the disclosure of the breach. However, consistent with the existing literature on CSR, we find that firms with a greater pre-event stock of CSR exhibit less negative market reactions to corporate data breaches. This finding suggests that high levels of prior investment in costly reputation-enhancing technologies such as CSR can be helpful to firms when they experience an unexpected negative reputation shock.
We also find evidence that corporate data breaches have long-term effects on firm value as measured using market-to-book ratios (M/B) and Tobin's Q. The effects we document are large: one-year changes in M/B and Tobin's Q for affected firms are approximately -10 to -20% relative to firms that did not experience a data breach. These reputation shocks are also long-lasting: they still have a negative impact on firm value at least four years after the disclosure of a data breach. Hence, while a high pre-existing stock of CSR seems to mitigate the market's initial reaction to data breaches, the long-lasting negative effects of data breaches on firm value suggest that firms might respond to such breaches by making additional investments in reputation-enhancing activities such as CSR.
We find that firms significantly increase their CSR scores in the years following a data breach, consistent with firms making a costly effort to rebuild their reputations following a negative shock. These subsequent investments in CSR are economically significant -relative to unaffected firms, affected firms' CSR scores increase by approximately 0.4-0.5 standard deviations in the four years following the disclosure of a data breach. In addition, following a breach, firms might be expected to incur one-off expenses associated with attempts to repair their reputations (such as the expenses associated with increased investment in CSR). Under normal accounting practices, these types of expenses would be recorded as non-recurring items. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that affected firms have similar (scaled) sales and EBITDA as unaffected firms, but report significantly higher non-recurring expenses in the four years following the breach.
We also examine different types of data breaches to determine whether certain types of reputation shocks are more costly to firms than others. In particular, most data breaches affect either customer records or employee records. We find that while value declines are more pronounced for data breaches involving customer records, firms subsequently increase CSR investment in cases involving both types of breaches. Finally, we examine firms' post-breach investments in different forms of CSR. We find that affected firms predominantly increase their investment in the "environment" and "diversity" categories (relative to unaffected firms). Under the assumption that firms are optimizing their CSR investments, this result suggests that firms believe that better environmental and diversity policies represent the CSR investments that provide the largest potential reputation gains conditional on their costs and implementation time.
We focus on data breaches because these events arguably affect corporate reputations while being plausibly unrelated to firms' business prospects or financial condition. Anecdotal evidence suggests that data breaches can negatively affect corporate reputation: for example, according to a 2016 survey by the Economist Intelligence Unit, C-level executives listed corporate reputation as the single most important company asset requiring protection from cyberattacks.
2 In addition, data breaches are largely idiosyncratic, the timing of such breaches is plausibly random, and except in rare cases, the breaches themselves do not specifically affect the quality of the products of services offered by the affected company.
As such, data breaches offer a number of empirical advantages over other types of negative reputation shocks such as product recalls, health or safety violations, fraud, other types of employee misconduct, fines, legal settlements, or critical product reviews.
While data breaches offer a number of appealing empirical properties relative to other types of corporate reputation shocks, it is possible that latent firm characteristics are responsible for both the incidence of data breaches and subsequent value losses or firm responses.
For example, the market may interpret news about a data breach as containing new information about managerial competence rather than containing information about a company's reputation. However, we find that the market responds differently to different types of data breaches, which is inconsistent with the argument that our findings are simply capturing differences across firms in governance or managerial competence.
3 Similarly, one might be concerned that cyber-attackers select target firms on the basis of other (possibly unobservable) variables that are correlated with the outcome variables that we study. However, parallel trends tests confirm that affected and unaffected firms experience similar trends prior to the disclosure of a data breach. Hence, it is unlikely that targeted cyber-attacks can fully explain the differences we observe between affected and unaffected firms.
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Our paper makes three primary contributions to the existing literature. First, we contribute to the literature on corporate social responsibility by empirically investigating a motivation for investing in CSR -maintaining and rebuilding corporate reputation -that has not been examined in previous studies. Existing studies have focused on the preferences and political ideologies of investors and managers to explain firms' CSR investments (Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim, 2014; Dyck, Lins, Roth, and Wagner, Forthcoming; Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014; Hong and Kostovetsky, 2012) . Second, we contribute to the literature on corporate reputations by identifying a setting in which firms experience a negative reputation shock that is arguably unrelated to the products or services offered by the firm. We also contribute to this literature by showing that a plausibly exogenous negative reputation 3 In particular, it is not clear why a breach involving (say) customer records would be more indicative of incompetence or poor governance than a breach involving employee records. In addition, given the plethora of other signals available to market participants regarding variables such as managerial competence, it is also highly unlikely that a data breach would cause the value of a firm to decline by -20% simply due to updated priors about managerial quality.
4 However, if selection bias were to exist, the magnitudes of our results would potentially be different than the magnitudes from a fully randomized sample.
shock can cause large, long-term reductions in firm value that are difficult for firms to recover from.
An oft-considered theoretical motivation for CSR investment is that CSR guards against reputation risk, all else equal (Albuquerque, Durnev, and Koskinen, 2013; Heal, 2005; Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012) .
5 Indeed, the benefits of CSR appear to be concentrated among consumer-focused firms (Servaes and Tamayo, 2013) . However, we are unaware of any empirical studies that specifically attempt to isolate corporate reputation as a motivation for firms' investment in CSR. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to document direct investment in CSR as a response to a negative reputation shock.
The idea that CSR can provide reputation "insurance" has also been the subject of many empirical studies (Barrage, Chyn, and Hastings, 2014; Godfrey, Merrill, and Hansen, 2009; Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; Hong and Liskovich, 2014; Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo, 2017; Vanhamme and Grobben, 2009 ). 6 However, these studies examine whether a firm's existing stock of CSR can help the firm when it experiences a negative shock, such as an oil spill, misconduct, regulatory actions, or a financial crisis. In contrast, we exploit a negative shock to firms' reputations and then examine whether firms adjust their stock of CSR in response to the event. Relative to the studies above, our paper also exploits a setting in which it is less likely that a negative corporate reputation shock is contaminated with other fundamental news about the firm's current or future business prospects.
The existing empirical literature on corporate reputations has focused on negative reputation shocks such as financial misconduct (Armour, Mayer, and Polo, 2017; Karpoff, Lee, and Martin, 2008; Murphy and Shrieves, 2009), environmental violations (Karpoff, Lott Jr, and Wehrly, 2005) and product recalls (Jarrell and Peltzman, 1985; Liu and Shankar, 5 A large literature has also established a positive empirical link between financial performance and CSR (Margolis, Elfeinbein, and Walsh, 2009; Edmans, 2011; Flammer, 2015) . Researchers have also introduced and investigated a number of theories for why firms may choose to engage in strategic CSR (see, e.g., Benabou and Tirole (2010) ).
6 Experiments have also shown that consumers respond positively to sellers that engage in charity (Elfenbein, Fisman, and McManus, 2012) . 2015). The evidence from these papers suggests that reputation losses are large and in some cases overshadow direct legal penalties. Our paper studies reputation shocks by focusing on data breaches, which have been increasing in frequency and scope. Our paper also arguably improves on prior studies by identifying a setting in which negative reputation shocks are unlikely to also contain fundamental news about a company's prospects or (for example) the threat of future regulatory actions.
Finally, a series of papers by computer scientists (Acquisti, Friedman, and Telang, 2006; Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, and Zhou, 2003; Spanos and Angelis, 2016 ) document significant negative short-term stock market reactions to corporate data breaches. Makridis and Dean (2017) also examine whether corporate investment changes following data breaches. We add to this literature by showing that data breaches have long-term negative firm value effects and by examining how firms attempt to rebuild their reputations following a data breach through investing in reputation-building activities such as CSR.
Data

Corporate Data Breaches
We obtain data on corporate data breaches from the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (PRC) website.
7 The PRC is a non-profit foundation that advocates to educate consumers about privacy protection. In addition to providing educational services, it has compiled a database of publicly disclosed data breaches starting in 2005. We download the list of breaches that affected private organizations (as opposed to government agencies or universities) and match these organizations to publicly traded firms.
Panel A of Figure 1 Figure 2 presents a kernal density plot of the natural log of the number of records breached over the sample, while Panel B plots the log of the average number of records over time.
These data breaches can take several forms, including external hacks, lost or stolen portable devices, insider employees improperly accessing data, physical theft of documents containing information, and inadvertent disclosure of sensitive information. 
Firm Data
We obtain data on firm returns from CRSP and firm fundamentals from COMPUSTAT. To maximize the probability of comparing similar types of firms in our tests, we constrain our sample to focus on firms in industries that were hacked at least once over our sample period (based on six-digit GICS classifications). We measure corporate social responsibility using the widely-used MSCI ESG KLD Stats measure of CSR. These scores are developed to provide an independent assessment of firms' social responsibility, similar to the manner in which credit rating agencies assign credit ratings. To calculate the score, MSCI first determines the presence or absence of a series of social responsibility "strengths" or "concerns" within a firm. The score itself is an index that sums all the strengths and subtracts all the concerns.
Therefore a one point increase in the CSR score requires a firm to change one corporate social responsibility category from a concern to neutral, or from neutral to a strength. The score can be further broken down into several dimensions of CSR: community relations, product characteristics, environmental impact, employee relations, diversity, and governance.
We make several modifications to the CSR score to account for the fact that the calculation of the index has changed over the years. The individual strengths and concerns making up the index have variously been added, deleted, and redefined. Therefore the index itself has not referred to a consistent set of actions over time. This is especially problematic around 2009, which saw a large redefinition in index components. To ensure that we study a consistent measure of CSR we create a time-consistent index. We take the following three steps: (1) we match indicators that changed names but covered the same concepts over time,
(2) we only use the indicators that are covered from 1991 through 2015, and (3) we limit our index to those indicators that were non-missing for the full sample in 2010, following the major redefinition. This leaves us with a time-consistent CSR score that we use in our analysis. It is made up of eighteen strengths and six concerns. 8 For ease of interpretation, we normalize the measure to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 throughout the sample. We refer to this measure in our tables as "Norm CSR." Panel B of Table 1 reports summary statistics for fundamentals and standardized CSR scores for the sample of firms that suffered a data breach that impacted at least 1,000 records (which represents the sample of data breaches that are most likely to be important). This is the main sample that we will be using in our subsequent tests.
Empirical Strategy
Short-term Valuation Effects
We first test whether the disclosure of data breaches constitutes a negative shock to firm. To do this, we directly analyze short-term stock market reactions following the disclosure of a breach. We measure cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) using a 100-day estimation window that ends 50 days before a breach is publicly disclosed. Expected returns are estimated using the Fama-French three-factor model. We estimate CARs for a number of different 30] , and [-1,60] , where the numbers refer to trading days relative to the date on which the data breach is disclosed. Our identifying assumption in these tests is that the revelation of a data breach is not correlated with a firm's expected return after controlling for the Fama-French factors.
To better understand heterogeneity within stock market reactions, we also run regressions of the form:
where c it represents the CAR for that data breach for firm i and time t, b it captures data breach characteristics, and x it represents time-varying firm characteristics.
Long-term Valuation Effects
To test the effects of data breaches on longer-term firm value and subsequent firm responses, we construct an annual panel of all firms from 1999 to 2015. As stated previously, we limit our sample to firms in six-digit GICS industries that have at some point experienced a data breach. This restriction eliminates 37% of the firms in COMPUSTAT. In order to study firms in the wake of data breaches, we create an indicator variable P ost that identifies the firm-year observations following the disclosure of breach. Our main specification is the following:
The variable y ijt captures annual firm outcomes such as the market-to-book ratio and CSR for firm i in industry j in year t. Industries are defined using six-digit GICS classifications. Timevarying firm characteristics are captured by x ijt which controls for ln(Assets), ln(Assets) 2 , and market leverage. We use two different definitions of P ost it to capture responses over various time periods. One definition identifies years 0 − 1 following a data breach. That is,
we define an indicator variable for the year of the data breach and the one year following it. The second definition includes years 0 − 4 following the breach. Finally, f jt represents industry0by-year fixed effects, and f i represents firm fixed effects. The inclusion of firm fixed effects ensures that our identification controls for any time-invariant characteristics that differ across affected and unaffected firms. The industry-by-year fixed effects ensure that our comparisons are within a given industry, within a given year, between affected and unaffected firms.
While our preferred empirical specifications include both firm and industry-by-year fixed effects, we also ensure that our results hold without firm fixed effects. To this end, we estimate the specification:
where T reated identifies whether a firm has ever been subject to a data breach.
Our identifying assumption in these tests is that data breaches constitute an exogenous negative shock to a firm's reputation. Indeed, the vast majority of data breaches do not directly affect a firm's products or services. Instead, they draw negative attention to the firm and may influence the firm's reputation among consumers, suppliers, partners, and However, we address the above concern by focusing on within-firm variation. We compare firms in the years after a data breach to the same firm at a different point in time. The necessary identifying assumption is that there are no omitted time-varying firm characteristics that covary with the probability of a data breach. Some firms may be more vulnerable to data breaches than others, but we would not expect their vulnerabilities to vary over time in a predictable way. We believe this assumption is plausible, particularly
given that a firm's information technology infrastructure is difficult to change and requires long-term investment.
A final concern is that some data breaches are not important enough to affect a firm's reputation. To alleviate this concern, we limit our sample to data breaches that meet two criteria. First, we focus only on data breaches for which the total number of records is known. Second, we limit our main analysis to data breaches affecting at least 1,000 records.
Our assumption is that these large breaches are more likely to have a negative impact on corporate reputations.
Results
What Characteristics Correlate with Data Breaches?
We first identify what firm characteristics are able to predict the occurrence of a data breach.
In Table 2 , the outcome variable of interest is whether a given firm will be subject to a data breach with at least 1,000 records compromised. Columns (1) and (2) utilize our full sample, whereas columns (3) and (4) include only those firms with a non-missing CSR score.
All firm characteristics are measured as of the year prior to the data breach disclosure.
We find that in the cross-section, smaller and more profitable firms are more likely to be affected. Looking at within-firm regressions in columns (2) and (4) reveals that firms are more susceptible when they are smaller and have a lower market-to-book ratio. Importantly, corporate social responsibility, as measured by normalized CSR score, is not associated with significant differences in the occurrence of data breaches.
To better understand these results we can compare the coefficient on the CSR score to those on other firm characteristics. The base occurrence of data breaches is 0.61% among firms with a CSR score in industries that have experienced a data breach at some point.
A one standard deviation increase in CSR is associated with an increase of 0.14 percentage points, or a 23% increase relative to the sample mean. We can compare the magnitude of this coefficient to that on the log of market-to-book, which has a standard deviation of 0.86. A one standard deviation increase in this variable is associated with a decrease in data breach probability of 0.29 percentage points or 47.5%, more than twice as large.
Data breaches and Firm Value
Short-term returns
We begin our analysis of the impact on firm value by examining the stock market reactions to the disclosure of the data breaches. Panel A of Table 3 presents average Fama-French three-factor CARs for a variety of windows around the disclosure of the data breach. Panel B presents CARs for breaches where at least 1,000 records were impacted, which constitutes our main sample of interest in the remainder of the paper. Figure 4 plots CARs starting 10 days before the breach event through 30 days following the event for breaches that impacted at least 1,000 records. We do not find any evidence of abnormal returns in the 10 days prior to the disclosure of the hack. However, there are large negative price reactions to the announcement of a data breach.
In the sample of all hacks the reaction ranges from -0.5% in abnormal returns from the day before the breach through the first three days after the event to -1.92% for the window ranging from one day before the event to 30 days after the event. Unsurprisingly, the effects are stronger for more important breaches, which we define as those impacting at least 1,000
records. The CARs for this sample range from -0.83% measured one day before the breach to three days after the breach to -2.57% over a one-month window.
We next explore cross-sectional determinants of the market reactions reported previously. Table 4 reports regressions where the dependent variable is a firm's CAR from one day before to thirty days after the data breach. In columns (2) and (3) we test whether the stock market reaction is related to attributes of the data breach. Consistent with our findings above, we find that larger data breaches, as measured by the natural logarithm of the number of records impacted, are strongly associated with a more negative response.
However, we do not find robust evidence that there is a different reaction for data breaches involving customer records or employee records.
In columns (4) and (5) we introduce firm characteristics as of the year prior to the data breach disclosure. The indicator for "high CSR" identifies firm-years in which a firm's CSR score is above the year-industry average. The estimates suggest that firms with high CSR scores in the year before the data breach have smaller negative abnormal returns. This is consistent with CSR providing reputation insurance. The magnitude of the effect suggests that having above-average CSR offsets the average 30-day CAR of -2.57% by 3.64 percentage points. These results also suggest that the effects of reputation shocks are lessened for large firms and amplified for more leveraged firms.
Long-term Valuation Effects
We further explore how data breaches affect firm valuations by examining how firms' marketto-book (M/B) ratios changes in the years following the data breach. Table 5 presents the results of this analysis. Specifically, in columns (1) - (5), we study the how firms' (log) M/B ratios change in the year of the breach and the year after, while in columns (6) - (10), we examine the effects of the breach on M/B ratios from the year of the breach to four years after. The comparison group for columns (1) - (4) and (6) - (9) is made up of other firms in the industries that at some point suffered a data breach. In columns (5) and (10) we include firm fixed effects so that we study within-firm changes in market-to-book. We find that across a variety of specifications, firms' valuations declined substantially in the years following the data breach. For example, in the two years following the event, market-to-book declined by as much as 22.5% in the model with controls and industry-time fixed effects (specification (4)) or more conservatively by 10.8% in the model with controls, firm, and industry-year fixed effects (specification (5)). We find that this reduction in valuation attenuates over the longer time period, although the relationship remains negative in all specifications and statistically significant in most specifications.
Other effects
We examine the robustness of our previous findings of negative short-and long-term effects on firm valuation for firms experiencing a data breach. First, we verify that we obtain similar results when we measure valuation effects using Tobin's Q instead of the M/B ratio. We then decompose firms' valuations into current and future profitability components by decomposing the M/B ratio as the product of firms' return on equity (ROE) and their price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio.
9 Table 6 reports the results of these findings. Panel A present shorter-term responses (event years zero and one), while Panel B presents longer-term responses (event years zero through four). Columns (1) and (2) of both panels confirm that we find similar effects when measuring firm value as Tobin's Q. Indeed, we find statistically stronger results using this measure of firm value. We also exploit the fact that the M/B ratio can be mechanically decomposed into ROE and the P/E ratio. Columns (3) and (4) of both panels examine ROE to capture the effects on current profitability, while columns (5) and (6) examine firms' P/E ratios (which should capture firms' long-term growth options). We find that firms' future profitability is most impacted by the data breaches. For example, specification (6) suggests that in the two years following the data-breach the P/E ratio declines by 3.11, or 18% of the pre-breach average P/E ratio for the impacted firm. We find slightly smaller point estimates for the longer-term estimation in Panel B.
We further examine firms' financial statements in an attempt to explain the decline in 9 Mechanically, M/B = E/B × M/E = ROE × P/E. In log terms, ln(M/B) = ln(ROE) + ln(P/E).
current profitability (as proxied by ROE) following the disclosure of a data breach. Specifically, we examine whether firms' sales or EBITDA change and whether firms are more likely to incur non-recurring items on their income statements. Intuitively, ROE could fall because of a decline in sales or a decline in EBITDA (due, for example, to higher costs). However, ROE could also fall due to the existence of non-recurring expenses associated with increases in firms' one-time investments in technologies such as CSR. (1) and (2) suggest that firms' sales do not seem to be directly impacted by the data breaches. Columns (3) and (4) suggest that corporate EBITDA declines modestly at a the shorter-term horizon, although the results are statistically weak.
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Finally, in specifications (5) and (6), we find that firms are more likely to report nonrecurring items on their income statements, which we interpret as an increased likelihood to engage in initiatives to rehabilitate their corporate reputation. For example, over the four years following the data breach, firms are 9.4% more likely to report a non-recurring (one-time) item, which compares to an unconditional pre-breach likelihood of 37.4%. We interpret these results as suggesting that firms are taking discrete actions to respond to the data breach.
Firm Responses to Data Breaches?
Our results thus far suggest that data breaches have a major effect on both short-term and long-term value. However, it is an open question whether (and how) firms attempt to respond to these negative shocks. One possibility is that firms attempt to rebuild their reputations by increasing their investment in activities such as CSR.
Corporate Social Responsibility
We next analyze how firms' social responsibility scores change in the years following a data breach by constructing a standardized version of CSR scores. Table 8 presents the results of these tests. While market-based valuation changes, changes in CSR scores are likely to change with a lag since firm actions to change their CSR may only be reflected in scores over time. For example, in order to change an environmental impact "strength" indicator from a zero to a one a company would need to implement a "notably strong pollution prevention
[program], including both emissions reductions and toxic-use reduction programs." Hence, although a firm may invest in developing such a program immediately after a negative reputation shock, it would likely take a few years for the program to become active.
In specifications (1) - (5) we analyze how firms' CSR scores change in the two years spanning the data breach, and in specifications (6) - (10) we analyze how firms' CSR changes over the four years following the data breach. We find little evidence that firms' CSR scores change in the shorter horizon following the data breaches, however we find a large increase in CSR scores over the larger window following the data breach. For example, specification (6), the most saturated regression model, suggests that CSR scores increase by 42% of a standard deviation.
We further study which components of CSR account for this change in Table 9 . Specifically, we split firms' CSR scores into the five (standardized) components that form our composite measure of CSR -community relations, product characteristics, environmental impact, employee relations, and diversity -and repeat the analysis of our most stringent specification in Table 8 . We find that the increase in CSR scores following data breaches come from improvements to firms' environmental and diversity scores (specifications (1) and (4)).
Indeed, we find that CSR environmental impact scores increase by 61% of a standard deviation, while diversity scores increase by 35% of a standard deviation. These results are also consistent with the theoretical findings of Albuquerque et al. (2013) that environment and diversity components have the largest impact on lenders' subsequent financial statements. 
Heterogeneity in Responses
As shown earlier, there is heterogeneity among data breaches, especially among the types of records that are affected. In particular, it may be that responses to data breaches differ across certain types of breaches. We re-estimate our main results on M/B and standardized CSR scores separately estimating the effect of a data breach that impacted customer records versus employee records. Table 10 reports these results. We find that the valuation decreases for both types of data breaches (specifications (1) and (2)), although the effect is smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant for breaches that impact employee records.
Specifications (3) and (4) show that firms respond to both types of breaches by increasing CSR, although this response is arguably larger following breaches that impact employee records. These results suggest that the responses documented previously are robust across various types of data breaches.
Robustness
Several firms are impacted by more than one data breach. We verify that our results are comparable when restricting the treated sample to include only the first time that a firm is subject to a data breach. Table 11 reports results the results on the outcomes studied in We find similar results across most outcome variables.
In unreported tests, we also verify that the main results documented in this paper are not a result of pre-trends and confirm to the arguments we outline in our tabluted test.
Conclusions
We exploit unexpected corporate data breaches to study how firms respond to negative reputation events. Data breaches negatively affect firm value by 10-20% following the event, and this effect lasts for years. However, consistent with a decline in corporate reputation reducing the value of a firm's pre-existing corporate social responsibility (CSR) investments, we find that firms significantly increase their investment in CSR by an average of 0.4-0.5 standard deviations in the years following an unexpected breach. Our paper represents the first empirical study to directly link CSR to corporate reputations and presents the first evidence in the literature that firms actively invest in CSR as the result of a negative reputation shock. This figure plots the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) starting ten days before the disclosure of a data breach that affected at least 1,000 records. CARs are computed using the Fama-French three factor model Notes: Panel A covers all data breaches that have been matched to public firms and have a non-missing value for total number of records compromised. The remaining variables are non mutually exclusive indicators for whether the affected records included employee data, customer data, or internal documents. The last two variables are indicators for whether the compromised entity was a subsidiary and whether the data breach affected multiple firms. Panel B includes all public firms that have been matched to data breaches in which at least 1,000 records were compromised. Firm characteristics are measured in the year of the data breach disclosure. The CSR score is normalized such that within the full COMPUSTAT sample the mean is 0 and the standard deviation is 1. All other variables have been winsorized at the 5% level within the full COMPUSTAT sample. Notes: The outcome variable is an indicator for whether the firm will suffer a data breach in which at least 1,000 records are compromised. All firm characteristics are measured as of the year prior to the data breach disclosure and are winsorized at the 5% level. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. * p<.10 ** p<.05 ***p<.01 Notes: Data breaches are included if the number of affected records is known and it is at least 1,000. CARs are measured relative to the Fama-French three factor model. Expected returns are estimated using a 100-day window and there is a 50-day gap between the estimation window and the date of data breach disclosure. The CAR windows are measured relative to the date of disclosure. Firm characteristics as measured as of the year prior to data breach disclosure. "High CSR" is defined as firm-year observations that have CSR scores above average for that year-by-industry cell. "Additional Characteristics" include indicators for whether internal documents were affected, whether multiple firms were affected, whether the affected entity is a subsidiary, and whether the breach utilized credit card skimming devices. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<.10 ** p<.05 ***p<.01 Table 5 : Market-to-Book Reactions to Data Breaches
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ln ( * p<.10 ** p<.05 ***p<.01 Notes: "Years 0-1 Post" is an indicator for whether a firm has disclosed a data breach in the current or previous year. "Years 0-4 Post" is an indicator for whether a firm has disclosed a data breach within the past five years. ROE and PE are winsorized at the 5% level within the full COMPUSTAT sample. Data breaches are included if the number of affected records is known and it is at least 1,000. Firms are only included if there has ever been a data breach in their six-digit GIC industry. Controls include ln(Assets), ln(Assets) 2 , and market leverage. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. * p<.10 ** p<.05 ***p<.01 Notes: "Years 0-1 Post" is an indicator for whether a firm has disclosed a data breach in the current or previous year. "Years 0-4 Post" is an indicator for whether a firm has disclosed a data breach within the past five years. "Sales/Assets" and "EBITDA/Equity" are winsorized at the 5% level within the full COMPUSTAT sample. "Nonrecurring" is an indicator for whether the firm has a non-zero value for a non-recurring entry for "Nonreccuring Disc Operations" or " Nonrecurring Income Taxes After-tax". Data breaches are included if the number of affected records is known and it is at least 1,000. Firms are only included if there has ever been a data breach in their six-digit GIC industry. Controls include ln(Assets), ln(Assets) 2 , and market leverage. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. * p<.10 ** p<.05 ***p<.01 Notes: "Years 0-1 Post" is an indicator for whether a firm has disclosed a data breach in the current or previous year. "Years 0-4 Post" is an indicator for whether a firm has disclosed a data breach within the past five years. The CSR score is normalized such that within the full COMPUSTAT sample the mean is 0 and the standard deviation is 1. Data breaches are included if the number of affected records is known and it is at least 1,000. Firms are only included if there has ever been a data breach in their six-digit GIC industry. Controls include ln(Assets), ln(Assets)
2
, and market leverage. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. * p<.10 ** p<.05 ***p<.01 Notes: "Years 0-4 Post" is an indicator for whether a firm has disclosed a data breach within the past five years. Each column uses as its outcome variable a different component of the overall CSR score. Each component sums strengths and subtracts concerns within a certain area of social responsibility. All measures are normalized such that within the full COMPUSTAT sample their means are 0 and their standard deviations are 1. Data breaches are included if the number of affected records is known and it is at least 1,000. Firms are only included if there has ever been a data breach in their six-digit GIC industry. Controls include ln(Assets), ln(Assets) 2 , and market leverage. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. * p<.10 ** p<.05 ***p<.01 Notes: "Years 0-1 Post" is an indicator for whether a firm has disclosed a data breach in the current or previous year. "Years 0-4 Post" is an indicator for whether a firm has disclosed a data breach within the past five years. "Employee Records" indicates that employee records were involved in the breach. Likewise "Customer Records" indicates that customer records were involved. These two designations are not mutually exclusive. The CSR score is normalized such that within the full COMPUSTAT sample the mean is 0 and the standard deviation is 1. Data breaches are included if the number of affected records is known and it is at least 1,000. Firms are only included if there has ever been a data breach in their six-digit GIC industry. Controls include ln(Assets), ln(Assets) 2 , and market leverage. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. * p<.10 ** p<.05 ***p<.01 Notes: "Years 0-1 Post" is an indicator for whether a firm has disclosed a data breach in the current or previous year. "Years 0-4 Post" is an indicator for whether a firm has disclosed a data breach within the past five years. The outcome variables are defined as in previous tables. Data breaches are included if the number of affected records is known and it is at least 1,000. If a firm disclosed multiple data breaches, only the first data breach is included. Then the affected firm is only included in the sample for the four years prior to data breach disclosure, the year of data breach disclosure, and for four years after. Firms are only included if there has ever been a data breach in their six-digit GIC industry. Controls include ln(Assets), ln(Assets) 2 , and market leverage. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. * p<.10 ** p<.05 ***p<.01
